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Beginning with Brown: Springboard for 

Gender Equality and Social Change 

THE HONORABLE M. MARGARET MCKEOWN* 
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown 
v. Board of the Education1 was not the end of litigation over discriminatory 
practices, nor was it the beginning of the end.  It was, however, the end of
the beginning. Brown marked a dramatic capstone to a series of lawsuits
challenging the concept of “separate but equal” embodied in Plessy v.
Ferguson.2  But it also signaled a new phase of civil rights litigation: 
advocates emboldened by Brown’s resounding endorsement of equality
sought new constitutional protections against discrimination.  Among them 
were women seeking to extend Brown’s logic towards a constitutional
mandate for gender equality.  Both the antidiscrimination principle 
articulated in Brown and women’s expanding role in society led to the 
development of Equal Protection jurisprudence that rejects the codification 
of gender stereotypes. 
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to
state laws that discriminated on the basis of gender and race.  In the now-
disgraced case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court upheld segregation in part
because “enforced separation of the races” in public spaces “promot[ed] . . .
* © 2015 The Honorable M. Margaret McKeown.  Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. My thanks to my law clerks, Mark Middaugh (Stanford 
2014) and Tatiana Sainati (Duke 2013), for their assistance with this essay. 
1.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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the public good.”3  Justice Harlan, in dissent, presciently wrote:  “Our 
Constitution is color-blind . . . all citizens are equal before the law.”4 
The Court’s same paternalistic, sociological view was reflected in an 
earlier  notable case involving Myra Bradwell, a female attorney.  In Bradwell
v. Illinois, the Court brushed aside a claim that the Fourteenth Amendment
required the Illinois Bar to accept a female attorney’s application for
admission.5  The majority sidestepped the issue of sex and instead focused
on the absence of a right to practice law in state courts under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.6  Three Justices upheld the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court to deny Bradwell a license because the “natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it 
for many of the occupations of civil life.”7  One Justice posited that the 
policy properly confined women to the “domestic sphere,” thus allowing 
them to fulfill their “paramount destiny and mission”—“the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother.”8 
Of course, these stereotypes were not universally applicable: not all 
nineteenth century women were timid or delicate and many had no domestic 
obligations that prevented them from attaining professional success.  Within
five years of the Bradwell decision, Belva Ann Lockwood successfully 
lobbied Congress to pass a law permitting women to practice in the federal 
courts.9  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court saw no constitutional problem in
permitting states to maintain laws that reflected stereotypes about women’s 
interests, desires, and capabilities. 
Despite dramatic changes in women’s roles in society—some small, 
some cataclysmic—the Court was not so quick to abandon the conception of
gender roles reflected in the Bradwell concurrence. These same
stereotypes about women’s physical and mental limitations repeatedly 
came into play over the next ninety years.  In the 1908 case Muller v.
Oregon10—decided three years after the Court in Lochner v. New York
held that “[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty 
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor”11 
—the Court upheld an Oregon statute banning women from working 
more than ten hours a day “without questioning [Lochner’s holding] in
 3. Id. at 548–50. 
4. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
5.  86 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
6. Id. at 139. 
7. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
8. Id.
 9. JILL NORGREN, BELVA LOCKWOOD: THE WOMAN WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT 
82 (2007). 
10.  208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
11.  198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
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any respect.”12  Rationalizing the difference in treatment between male 
and female workers primarily on the basis that women’s “physical well­
being” was “an object of public interest,” the Court zeroed in on the notion
that “healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring.”13 Additionally, in
the Court’s view, women were reliant upon masculine protection and
guidance and thus required “some legislation to protect [them].”14 
Forty years later, similar concerns about women’s special need for 
protection prompted the Court to uphold a Michigan statute prohibiting 
women from working as bartenders unless they were related to the bar
owner.15  In Goesaert v. Cleary, the Court reasoned that female bartenders
created “moral and social problems,” which would be mitigated if a “barmaid’s 
husband or father minimizes hazards” through his “protecti[ve] oversight.”16 
Once again, female inferiority carried the day. 
And then came Brown, where the Court emphatically rejected the theory
of race relations that undergirded Plessy. The opinion emphasized that
societal changes and emerging sociological research amply demonstrated that
“the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group.”17  Segregating public facilities by race was 
thus “inherently unequal.”18  The Equal Protection Clause took on new 
meaning.  In the wake of Brown, the Court struck down racial distinctions 
in buses,19 public parks,20 and marriage.21 
Even after Brown, and its unequivocal teaching that “in the field of 
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place,”22 the 
Court persisted in its reliance on stereotypes to justify differential treatment
of men and women.  In a challenge to Florida’s policy of automatically
enrolling men in jury service while requiring women to affirmatively opt
in to serve,23 the American Civil Liberties Union invoked Brown in its
amicus brief urging reversal: 
12. Muller, 208 U.S. at 423. 
13. Id. at 421. 
14. Id. at 422. 
15.  Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
16. Id. at 466. 
17.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
18. Id. at 495. 
19.  Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.). 
20.  Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (mem.). 
21.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
23.  Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
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We cannot turn the clock back to 1878, much less to 1215. The “separate but 
equal” doctrine, disposed of in Brown v. Board of Education, . . . persisted far 
beyond its time, teaching and spreading injustice for Negroes all the way. 
Suddenly there came a fresh breeze across our national life and the evil clouds
were swept away.  It was the impact of World War II, the coming of the United
Nations into our lives and our awakening to the world around us that brought this
revolution in our thinking.  Integration, we suddenly saw, was inevitable everywhere. 
 Just so with the advancement of women.24 
A unanimous Court in Hoyt v. Florida rejected the ACLU’s impassioned 
plea. Without reference to Brown, but with echoes of Bradwell, the Court 
deemed “rational” the Florida legislature’s view that excluding women
from compulsory jury service was necessary to protect women’s role “as 
the center of home and family life.”25  At the same time, the Court recognized 
that many women would be capable jurors—indeed, at that time thirty
states compelled women to serve as jurors on equal terms with men—but
nonetheless found no constitutional infirmity in Florida’s decision to 
codify the state’s presumption of female domesticity.26 
What happened next was nothing short of remarkable.  Whereas ninety 
years of social change after Bradwell failed to convince a single member 
of the Court that laws predicated on protecting a woman’s place in the 
domestic sphere constituted gender discrimination, the thirteen years after
Hoyt prompted a “complete swing of the judicial pendulum.”27  A series of 
three key cases marked a watershed in the Court’s recognition of equality 
for women. For the first time, the Court in Reed v. Reed established
that a distinction founded on sex “establishes a classification subject to
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause”28 and accordingly struck down 
an Idaho probate statute that gave preferential treatment to males.29 
Following Reed, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson30 tackled a disparity 
in family benefits offered by the military and held unconstitutional a policy
that favored military wives over their husbands.31  The plurality’s recognition 
of America’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”32 and 
the acknowledgment that “the sex characteristic frequently bears no
24. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae supporting Appellant,
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (No. 31), 1961 WL 102288. 
25. Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61–62. 
26. Id. at 62–63. 
27.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 540 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
28.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). 
29. Id. at 76–77. 
30.  411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
31. Id. at 690–91. 
32. Id. at 684. 
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relation to ability to perform or contribute to society”33 was a far cry 
from the rhetoric of Bradwell. 
Just two years later, in Taylor v. Louisiana, eight Justices—including 
four Justices who voted to uphold the constitutionality of Florida’s jury 
selection scheme—found unconstitutional a jury service system nearly
identical to the one at issue in Hoyt.34  Although much of the opinion centered 
on changes in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court expressly
repudiated Hoyt’s statements about women’s domestic role.35  Citing 
Department of Labor statistics on women’s participation in the workforce,
the Court wrote that the “evolving nature of the structure of the family 
unit in American society . . . put[s] to rest the suggestion that all women 
should be exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and the 
presumed role in the home.”36  The expanding role of women in public
life—when combined with the imperative of giving effect to the Constitution’s 
demand for equality—was simply too powerful for the Court to ignore. 
Over time, the Court paid increasing attention to the accuracy of gender 
assumptions underlying sex-based classifications.  One key issue became the
breadth of certain assumptions about women, such as the perception that
women are not as physically strong as men. While this may hold true in a
general sense, not all women are weaker than all men.  Recognizing the
limitations of broad generalizations, the Court began interpreting the 
Equal Protection Clause to mean that women must be given a chance to
prove their capabilities. 
This interplay between changing perceptions about women and the 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause for gender equality is perhaps 
nowhere more evident than in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case brought 
by Ann Hopkins against Price Waterhouse after being denied partnership
despite her “outstanding performance” and proven track record in securing 
major contracts for the firm.37 Price Waterhouse brought into sharp relief 
the damaging impact sex stereotypes have on women’s ability to succeed
in male-dominated environments.  The evidence confirmed that some partners
took issue with Hopkins because of her gender, referring to her variously
as “macho,” as overcompensating for her sex, or as needing “a course at
 33. Id. at 686. 
34.  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
35. Id. at 534 n.15. 
36. Id. at 535 n.17. 
37.  490 U.S. 228, 232–33 (1989). 
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charm school.”38  Hopkins’s expert witness testified that the negative remarks, 
including those by partners who didn’t know her, were the result of sex
stereotyping, and were compounded by the fact that Hopkins was the only
woman in the pool of partnership candidates.39  The scarcity of other female 
candidates made it all too easy to reduce Hopkins to her social category.  And 
because her behavior appeared counter-stereotypical, she stood out from 
the pack.40 
The ghost of stereotypes returned to haunt women again in United 
States v. Virginia,41 a case arising from the Virginia Military Institute’s 
(VMI) male-only admissions policy.  In declaring that constitutional equal
protection guarantees precluded VMI’s practice, the Court canvassed
historical justifications for gender discrimination.  Notably, at each turn, 
fears that women would prove incompetent or destabilizing had been refuted 
by experience.  Female lawyers, doctors, police officers, and soldiers have
enriched—not denigrated—our society.42 Undisputed evidence established 
that, notwithstanding obvious “developmental differences” between men
and women, at least “some women” would be able to thrive in the grueling
curriculum of VMI.43  A state policy denying women the opportunity to
attend such a prestigious institution based on stereotypes about what 
most women might want or be capable of “is not equal protection.”44 
Now, less than twenty years later, the observation that some women can
thrive in a grueling environment has become a reality. Not only are women
serving critical and dangerous missions in the military, two women recently 
became the first to graduate from the legendary and prestigious Army
Ranger School, where they passed all the same physical and mental tests as 
their male peers and impressed their fellow graduates.45 
Apart from constitutional advances, a growing host of civil rights 
statutes offer protection from both race and sex discrimination, among
other classifications.46  But the common-sense observation that race is not 
the same as sex or gender also holds true in the law.  While race is treated
 38. Id. at 235. 
39. Id. at 235–36. 
40. Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 89, 97 (1990). 
41.  518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
42. Id. at 543–45. 
43. Id. at 540–41. 
44. Id. at 539–40. 
45. Army News Serv., First Female Rangers Believe Experience Makes Them
Better Leaders, WWW.ARMY.MIL (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.army.mil/article/154253/First_
female_Rangers_believe_experience_makes_them [http://perma.cc/B658-JWPB].
 46. See, e.g. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C § 206(d)
(2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (2012);
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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as a suspect classification47 demanding strict scrutiny, sex-based distinctions
were traditionally evaluated under the minimal rational basis test and only
later under the heightened standard of intermediate scrutiny.48 When the 
Supreme Court later introduced the more precise standard of “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, 49 the bar arguably became higher, though still not parallel with race
discrimination.50  The Court in VMI referred to this standard as “skeptical 
scrutiny,”51 which interestingly derives not from the legal realm but from 
the scientist Carl Sagan:  “[S]keptical scrutiny is the means, in both science
and religion, by which deep thoughts can be winnowed from deep
nonsense.”52  Sex discrimination is indeed deep nonsense.
Just as the benchmark for measuring sex discrimination has shifted
upwards over the years, equal protection jurisprudence also needs to be
refined to confront the issue of race and gender “essentialism”—the analytical 
parsing of minority women’s lives in a manner that reduces gender and 
race discrimination to either gender or race discrimination.53  Essentialism 
thus “ignore[s] the complex ways in which race and gender intersect to
create social disadvantage,” perversely allowing minority women to “fall
through an anti-discrimination gap.”54 
Aided by the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, women have made
substantial progress since the days of Bradwell, Muller and Goesaert.  But 
let’s be honest—two steps forward and one step back hardly calls for a
celebration.  In the legal profession alone, women make up 47 percent of law
47.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
48. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).  Justice Rehnquist in his dissent termed 
the standard of scrutiny articulated in Craig as “intermediate.” Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
49.  442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). 
50. Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United 
States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 
1169, 1169–70 (1998). 
51.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
52. CARL SAGAN, BROCA’S BRAIN: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROMANCE OF SCIENCE, at
xiv (1979). 
53. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.  
REV. 581, 587–89 (1990). 
54. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES, 701, 712–13, 715 (2001). 
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school classes,55 occupy 54 percent of leadership positions on law reviews56 
and constitute 45 percent of law firm associates.57 Even so, women lawyers 
continue to earn just under 80 cents on the dollar compared to their male
colleagues58 and remain significantly underrepresented in legal leadership 
positions: women make up only 17 percent of equity partners in law firms,59 
only 20 percent of law school deans,60 and only 24 percent of federal 
judges.61  For women lawyers, the glass ceiling and the “sticky floor”62 
are more than theoretical barriers to equality. 
While there has been considerable research on women in the legal
profession, broader research reveals that the disparities are even greater in
the workforce at large.  Women make up almost half of the workforce, yet
full-time female workers earn only 77 cents on the dollar compared to 
men.63  Women’s overall participation in the workforce has dropped since 
2002.64  Additionally, “[o]ccupational segregation continues to be a persistent 
feature of the U.S. labor force,” with female-dominated industries paying less 
than those dominated by men.65 Frequently, these differences in treatment 
are rooted in unconscious bias rather than deliberate discrimination.66
 55. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE




 57. Id. at 2. 
58. Id. at 6. 
59. Id. at 2. 
60. Id. at 4. 
61. Id. at 5. 
62. REBECCA SHAMBAUGH, IT’S NOT A GLASS CEILING, IT’S A STICKY FLOOR: FREE 
YOURSELF FROM THE HIDDEN BEHAVIORS SABOTAGING YOUR CAREER SUCCESS (2007) 
(referring to “sticky floor” as career blocks that prevent women from moving up). 
63. Bryce Covert, Five Signs of Stalled Progress on the Gender Wage Gap 50 Years 
After the Equal Pay Act, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (June 10, 2013), http:// 
www.iwpr.org/press-room/press-clips/five-signs-of-stalled-progress-on-the-gender-wage­
gap-50-years-after-the-equal-pay-act-june-10-2013 [http://perma.cc/7BME-A4QG].  In
some fields, such as social services, recent female college graduates actually earn more
than their male counterparts, although the advantage evaporates when they reach ages 35
to 45. See Laura Colby, Women Earn More than Men in These Fields After College, 
BLOOMBERG BUS., (Aug. 5, 2015, 10:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-08-05/women-outearn-men-in-29-fields-at-start-of-careers [http://perma.cc/6D6N­
DHF2].
 64. INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE STATES: 
2015: EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 25 (2015), http://statusofwomendata.org/app/uploads/
2015/02/EE-CHAPTER-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/NB8C-UA3N].
 65. Id.
 66. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001). 
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To some, these disparities are the result of women’s biological make­
up and personal choices—particularly, the decision to prioritize family 
over profession—rather than discrimination, and thus a legal remedy is 
neither necessary nor warranted.67  To those critics, I say bah humbug. 
Gender equality and having a family and personal life are not mutually 
exclusive. What is missing is institutional recognition of this fact and the
will to change and knock down barriers to women’s advancement.  Yet 
stereotypes persist and continue to play a role in impeding women’s
professional advancement and full equality.  For example, mothers who 
take time from work to deal with family issues may be perceived as
uncommitted, whereas it reflects well on men to take time to handle family
matters.68  Likewise, where men’s success is typically attributed to skill, 
women’s achievements are frequently denigrated as mere luck.69  Research
reveals that women must prove themselves time and again, and often are 
judged only on their past achievements, whereas men are measured by
their future potential.70  Since employers and others may mask blatant 
discrimination, courts have an important role in addressing these tacit
forms of bias and the underlying persistent stereotypes that inform them. 
Of course, it is naïve to think the equality principle articulated in Brown 
and the cascade of cases that followed will eliminate gender stereotypes. Nor
is the mere existence of a stereotype necessarily discrimination: as the 
Court recognized in VMI, there are “inherent differences” between men
and women—and these “remain cause for celebration.”71  But what the
sixty years since Brown have made clear is that the Constitution forbids 
laws and practices that enshrine discriminatory stereotypes into government
policy and denigrate the female sex.  Such assumptions may not be used 
67. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society:
A Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971, 1065– 
66 (1995) (arguing that women are seen being less likely to possess traditionally masculine 
traits like “aggressiveness, ambition and drive, strong career orientation . . ., and risk-
taking” than men and that these temperamental differences, together with women’s “greater
commitment to families . . . have a powerful effect”); Richard A. Posner, Conservative 
Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 199–200 (hypothesizing that nature may be the 
reason women “are more devoted to children” and less “involved in career” than men, but
that regardless of the reason, we should not “greet governmental regulation of the family
structure with open arms”). 
68. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FAIR MEASURE: 
TOWARD EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS app. 7, at 71 (2d ed. 2008). 
69. Id.
 70. Id. at 72. 
71.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
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“as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.”72  That our forebears may not have envisaged
women performing brain surgery or serving as judges is of no moment: 
because “some women” have proved that they can do so, denying that
opportunity to all women violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
That historically disadvantaged groups will continue to break new 
ground in American life is inevitable.  That constitutional law evolve to
preserve and expand the principle of equality announced in Brown is 
imperative.
 72. Id. at 534. 
824 
